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Peasants are survivor actors: they allocate all their resources and deploy refined strategies for 
securing  a  smooth  horizon  of  consumption.  Their  stylized  behavior  is  irrational  only  if 
development is the goal the peasant should follow. Subsistence as expression for describing 
rural economies is inadequate, since it doesn't connote the risk of starvation or death that 
peasants face. The survivor actor poses descriptive demands and normative implications. At a 
descriptive level, peasant's risk behavior is not ruled by inner preferences only, but depends on 
his expectations for securing a smooth consumption during the crop cycle. The utility model is 
apt for describing the survivor actor. Yet the exponent that defines the curvature of the utility 
includes a component that captures the aversion to uncertainty and a component that grasps 
the expectations about the chances to secure the horizon of consumption. This component 
defines a function of risk behavior, a counterpart of the Arrows-Pratt function of risk aversion. 
A normative for the survivor actor has to consider what is feasible, not what is desirable; what 
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   2 
Introduction 
 
This work argues survival is the economic motive of the peasants as their behavior is ruled 
by survival concerns. Survival is the only feasible end to be pursued for most agents of 
rural areas. With refinements, the utility model and the rationale of the theories of risk 
describe the survivor peasant. The implications of the survivor peasant are essentially 
normative. Indeed, the lack of awareness of the survivor nature of peasants is due to the 
veil stretched by the normative of development.   
 
Former notions of peasants related with the survivor actor appeared since the work of 
Chayanov in 1926, in the works of Polanyi during the 40’s, the safety first of Roy (1952), 
Georgescu Roegen and Amartya Sen at the 60’s, and more recently and normative, within 
the rural livelihoods. Even though these versions grasped more adequately the economic 
motives  of  the  peasants,  they  suffered  the  shortcomings  of  the  theory  and  lack  of 
information.  The  claims  of  these  approaches  were  additionally  overshadowed  by  a 
widespread  interest  in  development.  The  main  obstacle,  for  the  recognition  of  the 
survivor peasant and the construction of a consequent normative is still the unquestioned 
assumption that peasants pursue for development even though their stylized behavior 
reveals survival is their actual goal. 
 
Among  scholars,  the  featuring  of  peasants  with  one  remarkable  attribute  has  been  a 
tradition  aimed to  grasp  their  distinctive behavior.  These  short  characterizations have 
powerful influence in the picture that scholars build up about the behavioral baseline from 
which any process for development should start. These expressions pose an idea about 
the  fitness  of  peasants’  behavior  with  respect  to  the  expected  conduct  required  for 
development. At the beginning of the last century peasants were considered irrational 
actors. During the fifties and beyond, it popularized the idea of peasants as subsistent 
players,  very  close  to  the  actor  described  by  Chayanov.  The  triumph  of  development 
economists was the acknowledgement of the optimizing peasant. Later it emerged the 
notion of peasants as risk coping actors, yet this term has not been widely adopted as the 
subsistent  or  chayanovian  peasant.  But  those  expressions,  irrational,  optimizing, 
subsistent or chayanovian, and risk-coping peasant, cannot grasp both the crucial role of 
risk  and  the  main  concern  of  survivor  individuals:  the  temporal  smoothing  of  their 
consumption. Peasants are under risk of hunger and they act upon consequently. 
 
The  research  of  development  economics  has  disclosed  the  functioning  of  the  rural 
households. Scholars have scrapped up to the smallest element of the peasants’ engine in 
the search of an ill mechanism that after repaired would trigger development. Beyond the 
explication of the inefficient behavior from the peasants’ inner aversion to risk, the ill 
device has not been found. Yet, these researches have revealed that the strategies of rural 
households are for smoothing consumption in front of risk, not for growing on wealth. 
 
The research in development economics has uncovered the survivor peasant, but the lack 
of questioning of development has impeded its discovery. The refinement of theories and   3 
tools developed during the 20
th century, that allowed grasp the economic behavior of 
peasants, has not been accompanied with a similar evolution of the normative analysis, 
focused since the 19
th century on the strengthening of markets for credit, insurance and 
productive technologies. Development maintains an unquestioned status that impedes an 
open exploration of the normative implications of the survivor actor. Both the eagerness 
for the alleviation of poverty, the goodness of economic progress, and the soundness of 
the perfection of markets have probably been sufficient arguments for neglecting the 
inquiry to the normative of development. But there is an overwhelming fact impossible to 
disregard:  the  recurrent  failure  of  the  recipe  based  on  the  perfection  of  markets.  A 
critique to development is not feasible from its desirability or soundness. The questioning 
is about the attainability, reliability and durability of policies for the perfection of markets. 
Peasants are under siege by risk of starvation and policies for promoting the perfection of 
markets don’t fit with the basic concern of the rural actor. 
 
The paper first explores both the ideas developed during the 20
th century that serve today 
as basis for the economic description of the peasants, and the theories aimed to grasp 
their motives. In the second part, the stylized behavior of peasants is presented as optimal 
behavior for surviving. This part also shows that the behavior toward risk depends on the 
expectations of the households. The third section develops an analysis for disentangling 
actual risk behavior observed in peasants from inner attitudes toward risk and shows the 
shortcomings  of  the  theory  of  risk  aversion  of  Arrows  and  Pratt  for  describing  with 
precision peasants’ risk behavior. The analysis leads to define the concept of aversion to 
uncertainty in replacement of the usual concept of aversion to risk; and the function of 
relative risk behavior as a counterpart of the function of relative risk aversion of Arrows-
Pratt. Based on these concepts a model describing the economic problem of a survivor 
actor is developed. From the results of the model and in concordance with the message of 
this article, the fourth part outlines a normative for survivor actors. 
1  The Survivor Peasant in Economics of the 20
th Century 
1.1  From the Irrational to the Optimizing Peasant  
The ideas shaping our current discussion of the survival nature of peasants were already 
present at the beginning of the 20
th century. The interest on the development of Africa 
and India was already present. The discussion of British scholars and merchants interested 
in the cost effective provision of tropical goods had on one side the prejudices about the 
rationality of the Africans and Indians, and on the other the analysis of the economic 
conditions of these lands
1.  
 
During the twenties it appeared a book of Alexander Chayanov describing in a systematic 
way the peasants
2. The economy in which peasant households develop their economic 
                                                      
1 (Baillaud, 1906; Dodwell, 1910) Dodwell presented an extensive document about the economic problem of 
Indian peasants: permanent indebt, illiteracy, subsistence. 
2 Referred in Thorner (1986).   4 
activity was by him called natural economy. In a natural economy, Chayanov argued, the 
“human economic activity is dominated by the requirement of satisfying the needs of each single production 
unit,  which  is,  at  the  same  time,  a  consumer  unit”
3.  The  balance  between  consumption  and 
drudgery should therefore appear as a stable ratio, whose exact value depends on other 
variables like ratio between the number of working members and the total number of 
consumers within the family, labor intensity, land, etc. A central thesis of Chayanov was 
that the theory of “capitalist” economy was unable to describe the peasant family, since 
the variables used to model the unit, namely prices of inputs and wages, interest and 
capital used to calculate profits, couldn’t be used in a context with absent markets
4. The 
balance between work and consumption constitutes a first approach that very likely fails 
to predict the equilibrium, since it ignores all the considerations of risk. It is worth to 
notice  Chayanov’s  book  doesn’t  have  comments  about  the  role  of  risk  in  peasants’ 
economies. The lack of awareness about the crucial role of risk in peasant economies 
lasted until the seventies. During the sixties gained popularity the phrase economies of 
subsistence  for  characterizing  the  peasant  economy.  This  expression  has  been  largely 
associated  with  the  chayanovian  or  autarkic  peasant.  There  are  at  least  two  features 
outlined  by  the  expression:  the  disconnection  of  peasants  with  the  market-oriented 
economy, and the lack of awareness of the role of risk in peasant economies. 
 
The value of Chayanov’s work doesn’t rest on the claims he used to justify his research. 
These claims seem outdated. Economics has advanced in the model of the economic actor 
and in the comprehension of risk at several stages, i.e. the theory of absolute risk aversion 
of Friedman and Savage, the theory of relative risk aversion of Arrows-Pratt, the theory of 
asymmetric information and the understanding of risk sharing. Additionally scholars have 
developed tools for modeling the economic units submerged in imperfect settings. The 
modern modeling of peasant household doesn’t demand as assumption the existence of 
capitalism. Today it is possible to carry out the modeling of an autarkic household based 
on shadow prices, subjective discounting, and utility functions whose maximization is not 
necessarily  attached  to  the  maximization  of  profits.  The  legacy  of  Chayanov  comes 
fundamentally from his realization of the central motives of peasant families around their 
survival. Additionally, it is also remarkable to realize the null concern of Chayanov about 
the rationality of the peasants. For him, they are rational. 
 
At the beginning of the 20
th century economics was achieving a scientific status
5. This 
progression was synthesized in a seminal essay of Lionel Robbins published in 1932. The 
main message of Robbins was that economics has nothing to do with ends, but with the 
conflict between scarce means and ends. The universality of ends gave to economics a 
scientific status, and provides a scientific support to the idea that the economic actors are 
not obligated by destiny or by the soundness to follow certain economic end. But even 
though Robbins’s essay is nowadays considered a cornerstone of neoclassical economics, 
its message has been overshadowed by the interest on development as the unique end to 
                                                      
3 Chayanov, p. 4. 
4 Ibid, p. 3. 
5 As presented in the book” The Scope and Method of Political Economy” of John Neville Keynes, 1891   5 
be  pursued  by  all  actors  everywhere.  Economics  maintained  the  prestige  of  science 
though its cornerstone, i.e. the universality of ends, since this time has been ignored in 
practice. The political concern for the advance of the communist world and the western 
commitment with the Marshall plan for development tided the balance and narrowed the 
scope  of  economics  to  development  as  the  unique  end  to  be  pursued  by  everybody 
including the peasants.  
 
During the forties the economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi emerged as the solitary voice 
warning  the  consequences  of  development  in  rural  areas.  Economic  anthropologists
6 
claimed attention on the dismantling of rural world by the new deal. The discussion raised 
by anthropologists was indeed on the economic motives of peasants. Polanyi shows that 
“in traditional bands, tribes, and kingdoms, the institutions through which goods were 
produced and distributed were “embedded” in –an inseparable part of– social institutions: 
that  the  “economy”  functioned  as  a  by-product  of  kinship,  political,  and  religious 
obligations and relationships”
7. While orthodox economists worked on normative issues 
by  assuming  that  peasants  pursue  (at  least  should)  for  development  as  the  doctrine 
demanded,  Karl  Polanyi  and  other  economic  anthropologists  warned  that  the  social 
organization of rural communities of Africa and Asia were embedded on traditional modes 
of  production,  also  acknowledged  as  subsistence  production
8.  Polanyi  claimed  for 
historical  considerations  about  peasants’  origins,  ethos  and  customs.  The  claim  of 
economic anthropologists was not a refuse of development and growth for rural peoples, 
but on the features and historical trends that development economists should consider. 
The description of peasant households in economic anthropology lied on different tenets 
of the description pursued by economists. While rural households were considered by 
development economists as isolated cells and production units, the description proposed 
by economic anthropologists focuses on the relationships among households. Economic 
anthropologists centered their attention on the cultural and social environments ruling 
the  economic  behavior  of  the  households
9.  The  modern  research  of  development 
economics  in  risk  sharing  institutions  seems  to  give  soundness  to  the  importance  of 
cultural  and  social  structures  of  rural  areas,  recognized  since  the  40’s  by  Polanyi  and 
economic anthropologists. The social forms in charge of the economic allocation are today 
known as the rural institutions for sharing risk. The modern economic language accounts 
for  these  structures  in  a  different  way.  Polanyi  and  his  colleagues  defended  these 
structures not only from their economic function, but from their cultural value. In fact, the 
current research in rural areas is basically focused on the microeconomics of risk sharing 
institutions
10.  
                                                      
6 Dalton (1971, p. 3) points the origin of economic anthropology in the work of Malinowski (1922) and others 
like Firth, but the field largely developed from the work of Karl Polanyi (1944). Between the sixties and the 
seventies –see for example Economic Anthropology and Development (Dalton, 1971) and Tribal and Peasant 
Economies. Ed. George Dalton (1967)–, further contributions to the understanding of the peasantry are due 
to Dalton and others Including Paul Bohannan, Clifford Geertz and Eric Wolf. 
7 Dalton, 1971, p. 13 
8 Dalton, 1962, p. 361 
9Dalton, 1971, p. 218 
10 Barret et al 2001; Fafchamps et al 2003; Murdoch 2002; Hemskerk et al 2003; Skoufias 2007.    6 
 
The contributions of economic anthropologists were sketched and criticized as ideological 
and  noisy  for  development.  Anthropologists  were  tacit  if  not  directly  accused  of 
presenting the peasants as irrational. The concept of economic rationality attempts to be 
free of values. The definition of economic rationality was formulated by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern within a game theoretic framework. But the expression holds values. As 
far as the literature about rural development of the beginning of the 20
th century allows 
observe,  the  discussion  about  rationality  roots  in  the  incomprehensible  behavior  of 
peasant and primitive societies. Indeed, rationality emerged as a problem, as western 
merchant demanded goods and inputs of tropical regions at competitive prices. Other 
scholars  observed  “peasant  values”  as  obstacles  for  innovation
11.  In  other  words,  the 
problem  of  peasants’  rationality  emerged  from  the  challenge  of  transforming  those 
primitive  and  peasant  communities  into  the  western  economy.  The  allegation  against 
economic anthropologists was not at the technical free of values level, but at the ethical 
level. The accusation encloses a defense of the intellectual capabilities of peasants and 
some indignation. But Polanyi’s concern was that the tissue of social relationships existing 
among rural and primitive societies was destroyed by the market society imposed by the 
western  society.  Polanyi  emphasizes  the  fact  that  markets  as  nowadays  they  are 
understood have not existed before our current western civilization. 
 
The  scholars’  discussion  during  the  50’s  and  60’s  was  dominated  by  development. 
Peasants were recognized as rational, though subsistent actors. The subsistent peasant 
was  associated  with  the  chayanovian  peasant.  Both  expressions  denote  isolated  units 
engaged in self subsistence. But it can be observed, these expressions lack of awareness 
on the role of risk. The interest on risk was firstly attended by Friedman and Savage in 
1949. Friedman’s contributions were fundamental, both in risk and consumption. In risk, 
he offered a first approach that integrated risk in the microeconomic analysis based on 
utility  functions.  In  consumption,  under  the  Permanent  Income  Hypothesis,  Friedman 
argued that economic actors make decisions on consumption regarding their expectations 
about future trials of income, more than on present income, as presented by Keynes.  
 
In 1952 Roy proposed the safety first theory to conciliate the utilitarian approach and the 
insights provided by Friedman and Savage, with the observed reluctance of peasants to 
policies. For Roy, the undesired behavior of peasants is explained by survival motives 
taking into account the inherent risk of rural economic contexts. Unfortunately, these 
contributions were hidden by the failure of his bet for predicting peasants’ behavior based 
on  the  pursuing  of  certain  fixed  and  well  known  rules.  Roy  proposed  that  peasants 
maximize their utilities by minimizing the variance of the sources of income. In order to do 
that, Roy’s hypothesized that peasants follow fixed rules and disregard other economic 
options.  He  argued,  to  maximize  Utility,  peasants  minimize  the  risk  of  failure.  They 
                                                      
11 Dodson and Bose, 1962; Bose, 1962.   7 
attempt to maximize their chances to survive. However, beyond these aspects favoring 
the approach, it has been theoretically questioned
12 and experimentally rejected
13.  
 
Wiens (1977) criticized the interpretation of a certain minimal consumption, because ”if 
one accept this, one must be prepared to argue that farm employers and landlords act in 
collusion with farm laborers and tenants to maintain a wage level that is higher than 
would  be  determined  by  competitive  equilibrium”  (p.48).  There  is  no  factual  or 
institutional evidence of such collusion. Additionally, if peasants are looking for a minimal 
and safe level of consumption, it is necessary to accept they are not maximizing their 
utilities, but trying to maintain their consumption at a fixed level. Peasants do not want to 
maximize their utility functions, but to maximize their chances to survive
14. Under the 
safety-first  rule,  it  is  considered  all  the  strategies  deployed  by  peasants  are  fixed 
strategies,  like  institutional  mechanisms,  to  achieve  a  fixed,  low,  but  safe  level  of 
consumption. Peasants as risk-averse actors develop conservative strategies viewed as 
rules for safety, to maximize their chances to survive. Binswanger (1982) and Shahabuddin 
et al. (ibid) rejected experimentally the safety-first rule. They proved the safety-first rule 
doesn’t predict peasant behavior. Furthermore, the safety-first rule became a normative 
approach:  if  peasants  search  for  minimal  but  stable  consumption,  policies  should  be 
focused on such minimal level. This posture provoked discussions because of ideological 
biases. Yet, the problem of the Roy’s approach was not the principles it rested upon but, 
as it will be argued, the definition used for risk and the assumptions of peasants as being 
risk averse only. The safety first failed because its bet was to predict peasants’ behavior 
from immovable risk-averse strategies. 
 
The  father  of  the  modern  approach  in  economics  for  rural  development  is  Theodore 
Schultz. His work was already acknowledged before the fifties though his book published 
in 1964, is usually taken as his seminal reference. As the book’s title, the task he tackles is 
“Transforming  Traditional  Agriculture”.  Schultz’s  work  is  contextualized  by  the  green 
revolution (1940–1960) and the trails of the Marshall’s plan, that gave impetus to the 
problem  of  peasants’  development.  His  contribution  to  the  discussion  of  peasant 
development has had long term impact both in positive and normative issues. It prevailed 
as the mainstream in economics. 
 
Theodore  Schultz  channeled  the  problem  of  peasant  development  in  an  economic 
framework. According to Schultz, the economic analysis plays as an instrument against 
political  creeds  about  rural  economic  agents.  He  argued  that  peasant  households  are 
rational and efficient units: they operate at the optimal levels according their resources. 
He  consequently  defended  the  rationality  of  peasants.  His  position  intensified  the 
discussion  about  the  rationality  of  peasants,  and  as  counter  argument  some  authors 
showed negative supply responses to increases of demand
15.  
                                                      
12 Wiens, 1977 
13 Binswanger, 1982; Shahabuddin et al., 1986 
14 Shahabuddin et al. 1986, p.123 
15 See for example Adams (1982).   8 
 
The focus of Schultz is the transformation of traditional agriculture, as a response to the 
vision of tradition and cultural forms defended by anthropologists, or the understanding 
of rural economies as different from capitalist economies, as stressed by Chayanov and 
Georgescu  Roegen.  In  1960  Georgescu  Roegen
16  claimed  for  a  theory  for  peasants’ 
economies, under similar regards of A. Chayanov and development anthropologists. He 
disagreed with the Marxists’ vision of peasants but also claimed the inability of the –he 
called- standard economic theory for grasping the economic features of peasant contexts: 
absence of capitalists’ institutions, no markets and search for subsistence and not for 
wealth (p. 4-5). Georgescu Roegen didn’t focus on the modeling of the household, but 
principally  on  the  role  of  the  peasant  sector  on  economic  development.  From  his 
explorations, Georgescu Roegen claimed for an Agrarian doctrine (pp. 33-34). 
 
An aspect of Schultz’ doctrine
17 is the role of prices in the transformation of agriculture. A 
high price of one commodity relative to other commodities’ prices would finally induce its 
production.  For  policy  design  the  implications  are  straightforward:  if  rural  actors  are 
rational, price incentives and improvements on productivity are the basic instruments to 
overcome rural poverty. Schultz’s book proceeded from a diagnosis to a general strategy 
for  transforming  traditional  agriculture.  The  diagnosis  of  Schultz,  from  which  the 
transformation of traditional agriculture should take place, based in three points, whose 
rationale can be presented as follows: traditional agriculture is efficient (peasants obtain 
the maximal benefit of their activity). Other options for earning additional income do not 
represent real incentives. Additional investments on traditional forms of production do 
not provide significant increments on income. Therefore, traditional agriculture though 
efficient  reproduces  stagnation.  From  this  diagnosis,  Schultz  proposed  three  basic 
questions  to  be  addressed:  i)  the  possibilities  of  rural  communities  to  increase 
substantially their production by an efficient allocation of the agricultural factors; ii) the 
key  agricultural  factors  responsible  for  the  highest  marginal  productivity  and  iii)  the 
conditions for incentive investment in agriculture. For Schultz, the agricultural factors that 
can overcome stagnation of traditional agriculture demand investments on new forms of 
production, for higher marginal benefits of agriculture, and investments on human capital. 
Schultz’  positions  served  as  starting  point  for  development  programs  based  on  price 
incentives. For him, policies based on price incentives with investment on human capital 
and green revolution technology were the basics to trigger rural development. 
 
Schultz’s work received great acceptance among development scholars mostly because it 
provided  a  theoretical  support  for  the  theories  of  development,  appeared  during  the 
fifties (i.e. Jorgenson, 1951; Lewis, 1954) very trendy during the sixties. After the sixties 
these theories loose force, but it remained the notion that peasants act rationally. 
 
                                                      
16 Economic Theory and Agrarian Economics. 
17 stressed by K. Boulding (1947, p. 438)   9 
An important legacy of Schultz’ work is the idea that peasants are rational. The theories of 
development loose force between the sixties and seventies, but the idea that peasants are 
rational consolidated. The defense of the rationality of peasants and that they respond to 
economic  incentives,  constitute  the  main  outline  of  what  is  actually  known  as  the 
optimizing peasant, a term used by other authors of the epoch
18. 
 
However, the image of the optimizing peasant not only expresses the idea that they are 
rational, i.e. that they act for maximizing their utility functions. It also encompasses a 
more questionable notion that they participate in the development process, and that they 
pursue for development. The image of the optimizing peasant encompasses the assertion 
that the peasants hold development as their central motive, i.e., that they pursue for 
growth in wealth. At the end, Schultz and other development economists
19 propose that 
peasants have to be regarded as farmers. This implies that they maximize some kind of 
utility function by maximizing profits. But, do they? 
 
The economic literature of the sixties revolved around new theories
20 and models
21 of 
development based on the dual model of development of Lewis (1954) and other works 
like  Jorgenson  (1951)
22.  In  the  Lewis’  model,  “the  underdeveloped  economy  becomes 
developed at expense of a change from the agricultural sector in favor of the industrial 
sector”
23. The enhancement of the industrial sector demanded labor. A first inquiry was 
about the possibility of supplying this labor from agriculture. Two visions appeared. Some 
authors  argued  the  existence  of  a  labor  surplus  in  the  rural  sector
24.  The  supply  of 
agricultural labor could be reduced without negative impacts on the agricultural output. 
The rural labor surplus appeared as a disguised unemployment
25 that could be assimilated 
by the industrial sector. A shift of labor to the industrial sector would bring about a raise 
of rural wages. In contrast, Schultz and Jorgenson (1951) considered that the marginal 
productivity of agricultural labor was close to zero and hence, the shift for industrialization 
would  be  only  possible  at  expense  of  a  reduction  of  agricultural  labor
26.  Hence, 
development demanded the transformation of traditional agriculture to compensate the 
labor drawback.  
 
If the process of development assumed a necessary shift of rural-urban labor, the raise in 
the  productivity  of  agriculture  could  be  induced  by  strategies  that  complement  price 
incentives  and  technological  transformation  of  the  rural  farm.  Hence,  the  theories  of 
                                                      
18 Lipton, 1968. 
19 Mellor, (1966), Mosher (1966).  
20 See Johnston (1970) and its references for a general survey on theories of development. 
21 Zarembka, 1969. 
22 Examples: Ranis and Fei, 1961; Enke, 1962; Ranis, 1962; Wellisz, 1968; Berry, 1970; Myint, 1965; Sen, 
1966. 
23 Ranis and Fei, 1961, p. 534. 
24 Sen, 1966.  
25 Enke, 1962a; Paglin, 1965; Neher, 1966; Jorgenson, 1967; Wellisz, 1968; Guha, 1969; Berry, 1970; Sen, 
1967; Berry and Soligo, 1968. 
26 See Sen, 1967 for a critique.   10 
development demanded to test the responsiveness of peasants to price incentives. Some 
authors found that peasants respond to price incentives
27, and some others that they 
don’t
28. Moreover some authors reported negative supply responses to price incentives
29. 
Peasants were not only impassive to price incentives: they decreased the supply of food 
crops under high prices. 
 
How to understand the negative supply response of peasants? A positive supply response 
informs the peasants’ position for participating in markets to earn profits. But, what the 
peasants  do  with  money  if  the  markets  for  substituting  the  sold  out  food  cannot  be 
reached? The lack of responsiveness and the negative supply response reflects the fact 
that peasants are forced to store food from the inexistence of markets for substitutes. 
Peasants act optimally as consumers by preparing them in front of the scarcity to be 
produced by the raise of the demand
30. What defines the motives of the peasant is not his 
desire for development, but the pervasiveness of the imperfection of markets.  
 
The  theories  of  development  declined  at  the  end  of  the  sixties
3132.  At  the  seventies, 
scholars turned their interest into the exploration of risk and rural institutions. At the end, 
the underlying interest on institutions relates to a more general concern on the influence 
that risk plays in peasants’ decisions, in their performance, and in the arrangements set in 
rural communities to cope with risk and uncertainty. Institutions are economic responses 
to risk and uncertainty, as it synthesizes the theory of asymmetric information of Stiglitz. 
At the end of the 60’s the failure of policies for rural development everywhere forced 
scholars  to  focus  more  carefully  their  attention  on  the  economic  structure  of  rural 
settings, with the help of the new theories of risk behavior appeared during the sixties. 
 
The connection between risk and consumption in time, as the basis of the rationale of 
survivor  behavior,  was  explored  by  Sandmo  (1970)  under  the  title  “the  effect  of 
uncertainty on saving decisions”. He develops a model of utility with two variables: the 
consumptions of today and tomorrow. Additionally, he considers two types of risk: the risk 
of  income,  which  relates  to  the  risk  of  falling  under  a  certain  minimal  level  of 
consumption;  and  the  risk  of  capital  investments,  which  relates  to  the  risk  of  capital 
losses. The most important conclusion of Sandmo is that the increased uncertainty about 
future  income  decreases  consumption  by  increasing  savings.  Additionally  (p.  357)  “an 
increase in the degree of risk makes the consumer less inclined to expose his resources to 
the possibility of loss”. His contribution for survivor actors was that  increased  uncertainty 
about future income decreases consumption (p. 356): i.e. that consumption does not correlate 
                                                      
27 Bauer and Yamey, 1959; Falcon, 1964; Hogendorn, 1967. 
28 As for example Stern, 1962. 
29Bardhan, K. (1970), Nowshirvani, (1971). 
30 As it is shown by Nowshirvani(1971). 
31 During the seventies few papers were concerned with topics of the sixties’ fashion like dual economy and 
labor surplus. Dixit (1971) treated the short run equilibrium and shadow prices in the dual economy. 
32 The end of the debate about rural surplus seems due to Hamilton (1975) who showed that under risk 
aversion, the necessary condition for labor surplus, i.e. the constancy of the marginal rate of substitution 
between income and effort, doesn’t hold.   11 
with  income.  Block  and  Heineke  (1972)  extended  the  analysis  of  Sandmo  to  the 
uncertainty on savings. 
 
The  seventies  witnessed  a  change  of  perspective  in  the  analysis  of  rural  households, 
forced  by  the  failure  of  programs  for  development.  There  emerged  the  need  for 
understanding  the  imperfection  of  rural  markets,  the  apparent  inefficiency  of  rural 
contracts, and the role of risk in peasants’ decisions. From the seventies, different subjects 
related with risk in rural areas were studied and clarified at some extent. The exploration 
is  being tackled under four  lines:  (i)  rural  institutions,  (ii)  the  assessment of  attitudes 
toward  risk  prevailing  in  rural  households,  (iii)  the  study  of  the  determinants  of  risk 
behavior  and  (iv),  the  acknowledgement  of  the  instances  in  which  risk  brings  about 
inefficiencies. The research and the progression of theories related to risk, brought about 
a refined language
33 for taking into account the concerns of the household, and created a 
new  picture  for  describing  the  rural  actor:  the  risk-coping  peasant.  It  stresses  that 
peasants engage in coping with risk
34. 
 
The risk-coping peasant didn’t emerge as counterpart of the optimizing peasant pursuing 
for development. It is taken as granted that development is the ulterior goal beyond risk 
coping.  Many  authors  argue  that  investigations  on  risk  coping  are  important  for 
development,  without  noticing  that  risk  sharing  emerges  as  a  strategy  for  surviving. 
Optimal  risk  sharing  in  rural  areas  can  not  lead  to  development,  but  to  reduced 
vulnerability  only.  Yet,  it  is  increasingly  acknowledged  that  the  so  called  risk  coping 
strategies indeed are for smoothing consumption
35. 
1.2  The Risk-Coping Peasant 
There is a rationale that shows peasant as risk coping actors. Under this rationale, all the 
economic decisions of peasants are ruled by their aversion toward risk. By coping with 
risk, peasants secure their income. The timid behavior of peasants is explained by the 
conditions imposed by a risky environment. Therefore, policies not only should account 
price  incentives  as  Schultz  and  former  development  economists  argued,  but  to  help 
peasants to cope with risk.     
 
The  rationale  operates  as  follows:  Utility  functions  are  concave,  which  suffices  to 
guarantee the convexity of preferences. This convexity is a necessary condition for the 
consistency of the microeconomic theory. In turn, the concavity of utility functions creates 
the level of aversion to risk. If preferences are fixed and convex, the attitudes towards risk 
are fixed too. Peasants are willing to avoid risk and resign with lower but safer incomes. 
Risk aversion is the key concept to understand peasants’ behavioral outcomes. Since risk is 
                                                      
33 Expressions like coping with risk and smoothing strategies are representative of the language created by 
the risk coping rationale. 
34 Ellis, 1998. 
35 Eswaran-Kotwal (1990), Nguyen (1998, p.19), Alderman and Paxon (1992, p.2), Fafchamps (1999, p.40, p. 
71), Fafchamps and Kurosaki (1997), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995, p.228).   12 
everywhere  in  peasants’  economies,  risk  aversion  explains  all  the  sort  of  inefficient 
decisions  acknowledged  for  peasants.  Risk  aversion  explains  why  peasants  allocate 
inefficiently their resources. Since risk is everywhere and always, peasants allocate their 
internal and communal resources to cope with risk. Peasants have developed complex 
strategies to cope with risk. They include smoothing income and consumption, saving 
money and liquid assets, storing food and building up networks. Coping with risk is the 
task tackled by peasants to succeed in an uncertain world. 
 
The risk coping theory highlights the importance of risk in the economic decisions of the 
peasants. It provides a convincing framework to explain why peasants are preponderantly 
averse to risk. After the eighties, the exploration of risk in rural settings abandoned the 
search for a theory that integrates the utility model with actual risk behavior, and focused 
on all the strategies for coping with risk. There are two types of risk coping strategies 
(Alderman  and  Paxon,  1992):  inter-temporal  strategies  encompassing  saving  money, 
accumulating liquid assets, storing food, smoothing consumption and income; and spatial 
or risk sharing strategies that include diversification of crops, networking, gifts, etc.  
 
 
Figure 1. The risk coping rationale 
That  risk  is  everywhere  and  at  all  times,  and  risk  aversion  shapes  peasants  behavior, 
makes sensible to consider coping with risk the target of peasants’ agenda. The pooling of 
risk takes different forms: by smoothing consumption, income or agricultural outputs; by 
diversifying  crops  and  jobs;  by  making  use  of  informal  institutions  for  absorbing 
unexpected shocks; by saving money or accumulating and decreasing assets or food.  
 
The assumption that peasants are for coping with risk creates two biases. First, it sets their 
problem in an elegant, abstract, but misleading framework. While consumption smoothing 
is the major goal for peasants, under the rationale it is one more strategy to cope with 
risk.  It  brings  about  one  unsolved  theoretical  problem,  known  as  the  consumption 
smoothing puzzle: rural income is variable and uncertain, but consumption is consistently   13 
–surprisingly– smooth. Evidently, the puzzle exists inasmuch as consumption smoothing is 
not a goal, but a means to cope with risk. The puzzle is a consequence of the risk coping 
rationale.  The  theory  cannot  hold  the  evident:  for  survivor  households,  smoothing 
consumption is their major goal.  
 
The risk coping rationale brings about an agenda for research: to determine the drivers of 
risk behavior, to characterize risk attitudes among peasants, to determine the impacts of 
risk in the economic performance of rural areas, to understand the interlinking of the 
strategies for coping with risk and to establish the adequate policies for development.  
 
As it has been shown above, we still lack of theories that properly conciliate the drivers of 
actual risk behavior with the utility model. Yet, it has not been an obstacle to characterize 
risk attitudes. A second bias of the risk coping rationale is the autarky granted to risk: the 
agenda for rural households is to cope with risk, but risk behavior doesn’t depend on the 
economic  context. The coarse  idea  of risk  behavior  depending on  inner  attitudes and 
wealth, and not on the particular situation of the households, leads also to a risk puzzle: 
while rural actors reveal aversion to risk in the majority of experiments in economics, in 
many of these cases they behave as risk neutral, even as risk lovers!  
 
Nevertheless, once attitudes toward risk were characterized, the tasks in the agenda were 
to determine how risk affects the economic performance of the actor
36, and to analyze the 
sort of strategies the peasant uses to mitigate risk and how they interlink
37. To survive, 
peasants display strategies as the participation in the available markets, accumulation and 
lessening of assets, smoothing, diversification and communal arrangements for sharing 
risk. A way to understand these strategies is to classify their elements
38. Regarding how 
these  elements  interlink,  one  step  forward  in  the  research  agenda  is  to  analyze  a 
multinomial  number  of  subsets  among  all  feasible  dispositions,  from  individual 
mechanisms, analyzing how two, three or more elements couple each other
39. 
                                                      
36 Feder, 1980; Hazell, 1982; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982; Chavas and Holt, 1996; Bontems and Thomas, 2000; 
Lamb, 2003. 
37 Wiens, 1977; Kimball, 1988; Rosenzweig, 1988; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990; Alderman and Paxson, 1992; 
Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Besley, 1995; Murdoch, 1995, 
1999, 2002; Udry, 1995; Czukas et al., 1996; Ligon, 1997; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997; Nguyen, 1998; 
Warning and Sadoulet, 1998; Dercon, 1998, 2000, 2004; Fafchamps, 1999; Rose, 1999; Christiaensen and 
Boisvert, 2000; Barret, Reardon and Webb, 2001; Kurosaki, 2001; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Lamb, 2003; 
Zimmerman and Carter, 2003. 
38 Alderman and Paxon, 1992; Besley, 1995; Nguyen, 1998; Fafchamps, 1999; Rose, 1999; Dercon, 2000. 
39  Examples  of  such  investigations  are:  Do  the  Poor  Insure?  A  Synthesis  of  the  Literature  on  Risk  and 
Consumption  Smoothing  in  Developing  Countries  (Alderman  and  Paxon,  1992),  Nonfarm  Income 
Diversification  and  Household  Livelihood  Strategies  in  rural  Africa:  Concepts,  Dynamics,  and  Policy 
Implications (Barret, Reardon and Webb, 2001), Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-
Income Countries (Besley, 1995), Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are Livestock a Buffer Stock? (Czukas et 
al., 1996), Wealth, risk and activity choice: cattle in Western Tanzania (Dercon, 1998), ) Income risk, coping 
strategies  and  safety  nets  (Dercon,  2000),  Implications  of  Credit  Constraints  for  Risk  Behavior  in  Less 
Developed Economies (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990), Insurance Market Efficiency and Crop Choices in Pakistan, 
(Fafchamps  and  Kurosaki,  1997),  Rural  Poverty,  Risk  and  Development,  (Fafchamps,  1999),  Risk-sharing   14 
 
However, the agenda seems to bear stagnation. It seems the expected knowledge to be 
gained from further comparisons will not provide a deeper understanding of peasants’ 
microeconomics.  Risk-aversion  has  made  us  aware  suboptimal  strategies  displayed  by 
peasants  are  the  best  options  in  imperfect  economies.  And  now  we  know  peasant 
communities  display  several  sub-strategies  to  survive.  How  these  sub-strategies 
complement and substitute each other deserves current attention, but afterward it seems 
we  do  not  expect  to  find  revealing  matters.  Meanwhile,  we  still  assist  to  systematic 
failures in policy initiatives for rural development in third-world countries. 
 
The difficulty that researchers find by assuming the risk coping rationale, is that the role of 
the  smoothing  of  consumption,  and  hence  the  survivor  nature  of  rural  households  is 
absconded.  Even  though  the  literature  acknowledges  the  importance  of  consumption 
smoothing  among  the  rest  of  strategies  to  cope  with  risk,  the  logic  subordinates  the 
consumption smoothing motive to the risk-coping motive. 
1.3  The Achilles’ heel of Development Economics 
Economics bears an Achilles' heel similar to that borne by physics during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries. At that time, powerful actors couldn’t accept the Earth is not the 
center of the universe, and consequently that man is not the core motive for the existence 
of the universe. The work of Copernicus was declared heretic in 1543 and Galileo was 
legally accused by the holy tribunal of inquisition in 1615. The way for physics cleared as 
men were displaced as the central motive for the existence of everything else, and the 
separation between facts and beliefs triggered the development of the method and scope 
of physics. In spite of religious pressures, studies based on measures like that published in 
1572 by Tycho Brae helped Kepler to unveil the mathematical relationships shaping the 
orbits of the Earth, which in turn served as pillar of the synthesis of Newton. The approach 
became  a  tradition  and  today,  physics  is  a  theory  that  searches  for  describing  the 
observable world as it is (how and how much Galileo said), and physicists clearly recognize 
that the discussion of any teleology
40 of the natural phenomena belongs to philosophy. 
 
Like physics after the middle age, the interference of beliefs fetters the development of 
scientific economics, and it is significantly responsible for the low incidence of economics 
in the solution of social problems like the poverty in rural areas. Yet, what in physics can 
be regarded as the birthing of a science, in economics may be presented as the suffering 
of a cyclical ill. In spite of efforts of great minds in economics to make a clear distinction 
                                                                                                                                                                  
networks in rural Philippines (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), Risk, financial markets, and human capital in 
developing country (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997), Farmers’ Cooperatives as Behavior Toward Risk (Kimball, 
1988), Consumption Smoothing and the Structure of Risk and Time Preferences… (Kurosaki, 2001), Fertilizer 
Use, Risk, and Off-Farm Labor Markets in the Semi-Arid Tropics of India (Lamb, 2003), and more… 
40 Teleology. “The theory that the cause and direction of  changes  in phenomena are  determined by a 
previously existing plan or purpose, as opposed to mechanism wherein they are determined according to 
the laws of the natural sciences. All human actions (purposive human behavior) are teleological, i.e., they 
are activated by the purpose of the actor”. As it is found in http://www.mises.org/easier/T.asp   15 
between the descriptive and the normative parts of economics, it seems exist a tendency 
to mix up them, as if both were part of the same scientific language for describing issues 
as they are. Yet, the struggle has been concomitant with developments in economics, as it 
happened with the publication of The Scope and Method of Political Economy of John 
Neville Keynes in 1891 and the Essays on Positive Economics of Milton Friedman in 1953. 
However,  as  the  relevant  literature  in  development  economics  witnesses,  it  uses  to 
happen that scholars tend to lose the notion of the difference between descriptive and 
normative issues, as if the ways out of social problems had definite and immovable trails, 
as if the ways out were part of the description, as if they were the only scientific feasible 
options for providing welfare. 
 
The separation between facts and beliefs in economics is by no means attainable as it 
occurred in physics. The tendency to mix up normative and descriptive assertions roots in 
the nature of economic matters. The difficulty lies in the fact that men’s behavior, the 
cornerstone of economics, is inherently featured by beliefs about both the final aims of 
this  behavior  (a  teleology)  and  a  sense  of  what  is  right  (a  deontology
41).  Devoid  of 
teleological  and  deontological  senses,  the  behavioral  outcomes  of  men  are  like  the 
mechanical actions of robots. The social progress of robots wouldn’t present any interest 
for development economists, since these machines don’t hold teleological values. The 
concern of disinterested economists for helping others to develop seems motivated, not 
by the consequences of scarcity on the physical existence of a being, but primarily by the 
effects of this scarcity on the realization of what these economists believe are the final 
causes of the needy. The outputs of economic behaviors can only be understood under a 
teleological perspective. The concern of economics lies on teleology, and any teleology in 
economics is a belief. 
 
The setting of an economic problem holds by its own a sense of what will be the end to be 
pursued.  The  setting  of  a  problem  includes  in  the  economist  or  the  policy  maker,  a 
background, reference or perspective of the solution. Are development economists aware 
of  the  role  of  their  beliefs  in  the  setting  of  an  economic  problem?  Development 
economists usually don’t mull over the teleological and deontological nuances inherent to 
a  setting.  This  disregard  can  be  recognized  in  the  majority  of  papers  about  rural 
development,  from  the  easiness  with  which  the  argumentation  passes  from  positive 
descriptions to normative assertions. It is possible that many economists think that the 
setting  of  problems  like  poverty  in  rural  areas  of  underdeveloped  countries  are 
descriptions, as those descriptions of how and how much in natural sciences. But it isn’t. 
The setting of a problem in development economics holds a descriptive part indeed. For 
setting  a  problem  however,  the  description  has  to  be  presented  in  a  perspective  of 
something better. The economic problem exists insofar as the economic unit lacks some 
characteristics  considered  better  or  ideal.  The  problems  like  rural  poverty  or  rural 
                                                      
41 Deontology . “An ethics based on acting according to duty or doing what is right, rather than on achieving 
virtue or on bringing about good consequences. It is too crude to make sharp divisions or to deny a place for 
more than one approach to ethics”. As it is found in http://www.filosofia.net/materiales/rec/glosaen.htm    16 
development  exist  under  teleological  and  deontological  perspectives  only.  The  setting 
exists within a subjective framework of comparison.  
 
The Achilles’ heel of the current view of development economics as scientific approach to 
the economic problems of rural areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America, is not that the 
behavior of all actors is endowed with teleological and deontological senses. How could be 
presume that our economic ends, as consequences of our beliefs of our ultimate causes, 
are  the  same  feasible  and  attainable  ends  for all  economic  actors?  The  Achilles’  heel 
emerges from the inexistent awareness of development economists to separate between 
their  own  senses  and  the  senses  that  a  needy  actor  brings  into  the  realization  of  its 
particular ends. For the actual solution of an economic problem like the poverty of rural 
areas in underdeveloped countries, the imposition of a foreign set of desirable ends has as 
consequence the search for unfeasible and unattainable pathways for these communities. 
Otherwise, how to explain the insistence on solutions that have not worked? 
1.3.1  The Distortion of Development in the Economic Analysis 
It is widely and implicitly held that the economic description of the rural households aims 
to elaborate a cogent idea of how they allocate their resources. Yet, it is rarely conceded 
that this description reflects to an extent an underlying vision held by the observer about 
the motives impelling the observed to act. For an unprejudiced observer aware of the 
interference of his beliefs about how men and institutions should be, it would appear 
sensible that the cognition of rural households’ motives would be in evidence from their 
behavior and not be concluded or taken as granted from his own presumptions. If this 
scientific  approach  were  followed  by  scholars  interested  in  the  enhancement  of  rural 
households,  some  important  questions  would  arise  naturally:  Do  peasants  strive  for 
raising their wealth as firms? Do they strive for subsistence? Do their struggles just serve 
to survive? 
 
An unprejudiced scholar would naturally ask: what does make the peasants to decide 
among these options? Assuming that subsistence or survival are not desirable ends, if a 
policy is for transforming the motives and for inducing peasants into development paths, 
what does force them to follow one purpose different to development? What it happens if 
the external factors that could operate a change in the motives can not be endurably 
transformed? In short, it seems sensible to take into account both peasants’ motives for 
the right understanding of their behavior, and the relationship between the motives and 
the structure of rural economies in order to foresee feasible rather than desirable but 
unattainable, options. 
 
However in the real life the treatment of the rural household in economics has been done 
without the convenient awareness of the ideological and religious presumptions inherent 
to any analyzer. Indeed the economic analysis of rural households has been based on the 
prefixed ideas of scholars about the motives of the rural units, ruled by ethic and moral 
precepts of western scholars. During the 20
th century, development as the motive of rural   17 
households has ruled the interpretation of peasants’ economic behavior. The literature, 
both of the first years of the 20
th century on the development of Africa and India, and that 
of the fifties and sixties, confirms that scholars opted for assigning development as the 
desirable  motive  of  peasants’ households.  Even  today, the  majority  of  microeconomic 
research  takes  as  granted  that  development  is  the  economic  motive  of  rural  actors, 
everywhere. 
 
The imposition of a normative, in which development or the perfection of markets is the 
target to be pursued, is responsible for the paradigm under which the analysis of peasants 
is  currently  done.  The  assumption  of  development  plays  as  a  framework  in  which 
peasants’  behavior  is  judged.  The  idea  that  development  is  the  basic  goal  of  rural 
households made to believe that the economic behavior of peasants is irrational. The 
question of the rationality of the peasants was present among scholars and merchants of 
England interested in raising the productivity of Africans in cotton crops at the beginning 
of the 20
th century. During the first half of the 20
th century this discussion was nuanced by 
the conception of Chayanov and by the defense of the cultural patterns of semi-tribal 
societies, argued by economic anthropologists. The political concerns after the Second 
World  War  tipped  the  scale  in  favor  of  development.  The  Marshall  plan  for  the 
industrialization of the undeveloped world demanded to consider peasants as well fitted 
and  with  similar  mental  endowments  as  anybody  else.  Anthropologists  warned  the 
imposition of a model that didn’t fit with the structure, possibilities and expectations of 
the peasants. But development economists posed the subject in terms of the capabilities 
of the peasants for interacting and performing in a society ruled by markets. At some 
instances,  the  dispute  was  posed  by  development  economists  as  the  defense  of  the 
human nature of peasants, which gave them the moral victory. The discussion between 
anthropologists and development economists, posed in terms of the rationality of the 
actor, at the end was about the model of development.  
2  The Survivor Peasant 
Huge  evidence  shows  peasants  concentrate  on  the  provision  of  a  safe  and  stable 
consumption,  as  they  try  to  preserve  its  smoothness  from  any  shock
42.  Peasants  are 
survivor actors: they allocate their internal resources and deploy individual and communal 
strategies  for  securing  a  smooth  horizon  of  consumption.  Survival  defines  the  actual 
economic motive of peasants. Peasants behave as survivor actors, not because they want, 
but because they face risks of hunger and starvation permanently. 
2.1  Survivor Behavior 
The  survivor  behavior  of  peasants  can  be  acknowledged  in  different  instances:  in  the 
unproductive share of liquid assets at expense of capital assets, in the negative supply 
                                                      
42 Paxon, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Townsend, 1994; Murdoch, 1995; Udry, 1995; Jacoby and 
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response when crop prices are high, in the “inefficient” allocation of crop inputs, with the 
preference for resistant but low profitable crops, and the steady contrast between the 
variability of the income and the smoothness of the consumption.  
 
Keynes “believed that India was “… a country impoverished by a preference for liquidity which stifled the 
growth of real wealth” (Keynes, 1973, p.337)”
43. Many studies have explored the role of liquid 
assets,  as  it  has  been already  considered  above.  There  is  a  good  explanation for  this 
preference: “Assets  act  like  a  buffer  stock,  protecting consumption  against  bad  draws  of  income”
44. 
Liquid assets are preferred because they can be converted in cash and food. Assets are 
valued according to its reliability for covering consumption holes. What is the optimal 
share between liquid and capital assets for survivor individuals? 
 
Some authors found that peasants don’t respond to price incentives
45. Even more, some 
authors reported negative supply responses to price incentives
46; i.e. peasants were not 
only impassive to price incentives: they decreased the supply of food crops under high 
prices. The negative supply response indicates that the end pursued by the peasant as 
economic  actor  is  to  secure  his  consumption  in  time.  If  peasants  value  survival  over 
growth, they would prefer to save future consumption rather than selling this production 
for  increasing  profits  in  a  high  price  environment.  By  storing  food,  peasants  keep  in 
control the allocation of consumption. 
 
Some investigations, nowadays obligated citations for the state of the art
47 on peasants’ 
microeconomics, showed the outstanding contrast between the variability of income and 
the smoothness of consumption in rural villages. At the nineties it was regarded as a 
puzzle
48. The existence of the puzzle is given by the risk coping rationale: all the strategies 
of the rural actor can be seen as forms of diversification for coping with risk. In fact, the 
expression “smoothing consumption” was coined as one strategy for reducing risk
49. A 
former vision was to consider that consumption correlates with income
50 and therefore 
the puzzle arises as the contrast between the steady smoothness of consumption in front 
of the variability of the income. 
 
However, if the economic actor facing pervasive restrictions holds survival as his economic 
motive, the smoothness of his consumption emerges as his overall goal. There is no puzzle 
for survivor actors: all their strategies are for smoothing their consumption in regard of 
risk. Other strategies, like crop and job diversification, income smoothing and risk sharing, 
                                                      
43 Pointed out by Jalan and Ravallion, 1978, p.2. 
44 Deaton, 1991, p.1221. 
45 As for example Stern, 1962. 
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47 Townsend, 1994; Morduch, 1991; Paxson, 1992; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997. 
48 i.e. Black 1990, but many others.  
49 Rosenzweig, 1988. 
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are for smoothing consumption; or in other terms, for cancelling the risk of consumption 
holes.  
 
The instances above mentioned have in common a connection with risk. Keynes didn’t 
know the theories of risk, and for development economists of the sixties they were not 
sufficiently assimilated. Today, it is not necessary to argue that the preference for liquid 
assets, the negative supply response and the smoothing of consumption have in common 
a connection with risk.  Risk is the underpinning of the survivor behavior. The analysis of 
risk in rural economies has been accomplished under the theory of absolute risk aversion 
of Friedman and Savage, and the theory of relative risk aversion of Arrows and Pratt. Both 
theories rest on the model of utility, in which the concavity of the utility function defines 
the attitudes toward risk. The theory asserts that the actual behavior toward risk comes 
out from inner attitudes and from the level of welfare.  
 
The analyses, of risk and of the performance of rural households, have been made under 
these approaches. Moreover,  peasants  have been  reasonably  considered  risk-averse
51. 
The inefficiencies in the performance of rural households were found related with risk and 
risk aversion
52.  Additionally, it was found peasants deploy strategies to mitigate risk
53. For 
instance, risk  has  been  found  related  with preference  for  resistant  but  low  profitable 
crops
54. Murdoch, 1995, p. 110 reports: 
 
“I find evidence that households whose consumption levels are most vulnerable to income shocks 
devote a greater share of land to safer, traditional varieties of rice and castor than to riskier, high-
yielding varieties (Murdoch, 1990).” 
 
Risk aversion has been found the ground for the low dosage of fertilizers
55. Murdoch 
(p.109) comments:  
 
“Bliss and Stern (1982, ch. 8) …find that fertilizer is a highly productive input in wheat cultivation, 
but the marginal product of fertilizers remain 3,5 times its price. Farmers could substantially raise 
expected profits by increasing applications of fertilizer, but by using less fertilizer, investment losses 
are reduced in bad times. The authors’ calculations suggest that the foregone expected profits are 
most plausibly explained by high levels of risk and risk aversion”. 
 
                                                      
51 Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; Binswanger 1980, 1981, 1982; Shahabuddin et al. 1986; Ansic and Keasey 
1994; Wik and Holden 1998; Cummins 1999; Nielsen 2001; Binici et al. 2003; Miyata 2003. 
52 Moscardi and De Janvry 1977; Feder 1980; Hazell 1982; Newbery and Stiglitz 1982; Chavas and Holt 1996; 
Bontems and Thomas 2000; Lamb 2003. 
53 Wiens 1977; Kimball 1988; Rosenzweig 1988; Eswaran and Kotwal 1990; Alderman and Paxson 1992; 
Coate and Ravallion 1993; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Townsend 1994; Besley 1995; Murdoch 1995, 1999, 
2002; Udry 1995; Czukas et al. 1996; Ligon 1997; Ravallion and Chaudhuri 1997; Nguyen 1998; Warning and 
Sadoulet 1998; Dercon 1998, 2000, 2004; Fafchamps 1999; Rose 1999; Christiaensen and Boisvert 2000; 
Barret, Reardon and Webb 2001; Kurosaki 2001; Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Lamb 2003; Zimmerman and 
Carter 2003. 
54 Feder 1980; Zimmerman and Carter 2003. 
55  Moscardi  and  De  Janvry  1977;  Brink  and  McCarl  1978;  Feder  1980;  Babcock  1992;  Murdoch  1995; 
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Other  practices  like  the  production  below  the  optimal
56,  inefficient  institutional 
arrangements
57, and use of costly credit institutions
58 have been considered the outcome 
of risk-aversion. Risk aversion has been shown as the cornerstone for the backwardness of 
the peasantry. Dercon says:  
 
“if the high return activity is also more risky, then differences in risk aversion may explain differences in 
portfolio’s across households. Poor households may then stay poor in the long run because they are 
risk averse”.  
 
Risk  and  risk  aversion became the  key  concepts  used to  explain the backwardness  of 
peasants. It is straight to link the inefficiencies on assets, inputs, etc., with risk aversion. 
But the problem with the approaches of Friedman-Savage and Arrows Pratt based on the 
utility  model  is  that  they  do  not  offer  a  further  ground  of  the  aversion  toward  risk: 
peasants behave averse to risk because they are averse to risk
59. Risk behavior does not 
result from as a consequence of the demands of the moment pushing the actor to take or 
to avoid risk, but it emerges from psychological preferences. 
 
In order to preserve the idea that risk behavior is given by preferences and not dictated by 
the demands of the situation, it has been considered the risky context influences the 
shaping of a given attitude: the inner aversion to risk has been explained by the physical 
conditions that likely have permanently forged such attitudes
60. Under this view, once the 
actor becomes risk-averse or risk-lover, his behavior is predictable and fixed. 
 
However, the explanation that peasants are inefficient because they are risk averse does 
not offer a comprehensive picture, because actual risk behavior does not come up from 
inner attitudes
61. The theory of risk aversion depending on inner attitudes and welfare 
cannot  grasp  that  other  variables  influence  risk  behavior.  There  lacks  theoretical 
approaches that once and for all link the behavior toward risk with the smoothing of 
consumption,  as  some  investigations  it  acknowledge.  Fafchamps  et  al.  (2003,  p.  285) 
mention: 
 
“Regression results confirm that consumption smoothing is an important motivation for gifts and 
informal loans, but gifts and loans appear, by themselves, unable to efficiently share risk at the 
village level.”  
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2.2  Risk Behavior 
Actual risk behavior goes beyond the risk-averse actor of Arrows and Pratt
62. Peasants do 
not act according to their inner preferences toward risk only. Different investigations, 
mostly  carried  out  during  the  seventies  and  the  eighties,  show  that  other  variables 
different to welfare influence actual risk behavior. Actual behavior toward risk is not ruled 
by inner attitudes exclusively, and the level of welfare explains risk behavior only partially: 
 
“…thus,  even  when  all  agents  have  identical  risk  preferences,  differential  risk  behavior  would  still 
obtain if the agents have differential access to capital”
63.  
 
The recognition that other variables different to inner attitudes and wealth influence risk 
behavior led scholars
64 to pose experimental approaches for grasping the factors different 
to inner attitudes that rule actual risk behavior beyond inner preferences: 
 
“The  differential  behavior  towards  risk…  is  explained  by  a  set  of  socioeconomic  variables  that 
characterize peasant households in Bangladesh”.
65 
 
These characteristics were found to be: human capital (age of head of the household, 
family size and level of schooling attained by the household head) and economic features: 
farm size (non-liquid), off-farm income (liquid), and the total value of the household’s 
assets (which is a mixture of liquid assets and non-liquid assets). That other variables 
different to inner attitudes correlate with risk behavior pose challenges to the accepted 
version of Arrows-Pratt and Friedman. Even though all these investigations were carried 
out during the eighties, still there exists a lack of theoretical approaches that conciliates 
the utility model with the mentioned variables
66.  
3  Aversion to Uncertainty and the Function of Risk Behavior 
This part presents an approach based on utility functions for modeling risk behavior of 
survivor individuals. It first introduces the unfolding of the utility model applied to the 
description  of  peasants  and  the  concurrence  with  the  safety  first  approach.  After 
presenting the reasons that made the safety first to fail, and from the shortcomings of the 
usual approach based on utility functions, the concept of aversion to uncertainty and a 
new function for describing risk behavior of survivor actors are introduced. 
                                                      
62 Wärneryd, 1996. 
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64 Principally Binswanger et al (1980,1981,1982) but others also.   
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3.1  Background 
At the eighties the expected utility model became the art for modeling the economic 
actor
67. During the same time the utility model gained room in the description of peasant 
household at the expense of the decline of the safety first rule. The theory of safety first 
failed to predict peasants’ risk behavior. Wiens in 1977 posed some qualms but the first 
signal of the weakness of the safety first rule came from some studies developed during 
the seventies aimed to grasp the variables that correlate with actual risk behavior
68. The 
final blow against the safety first theory seemed to come with a study of Binswanger in 
1980 that rejected it as predictor of peasants’ risk behavior.  
 
The safety first constituted the sole theoretic approach available at this time attempting 
to explain peasants’ behavior from some specific motives: avoiding disaster. The studies 
aimed  to  confirm the  safety  first  theory  of  peasants’  risk  behavior  were  inconclusive, 
probably because the bet was to predict peasants’ behavior from fixed rules. Additionally, 
it seems to have failed because the rule regards a random and not a permanent income or 
some types of enduring flows of consumption. As it has been argued, consumption does 
not correlate with income. The safety first was abandoned because it failed to predict 
peasants’  behavior  based  on  fixed  rules.  With  its  abandonment  also  disappeared  the 
unique theoretic approach attempted to model peasants’ economic behavior based on 
specific motives. 
 
Yet,  these  studies  that  made  the  safety  first  to  fail  brought  also  evidence  of  the 
shortcomings of the utility model in its usual approach for describing actual risk behavior. 
As commented, the assumed rigidity between preferences and behavior brings about a 
discrepancy  between  preferences  revealed  in  experiments  and  actual  risk  behavior. 
According to this view, inner preferences rule actual risk behavior. The aversion toward 
risk appears in the model in the geometric characteristics of well behaved functions of 
utility
69. In concave utility functions, the high marginal utilities come up from low risky 
choices.  Actors  averse  to  risk  scarify  high-uncertain  for  low-certain  payoffs.  The 
dependence of risk behavior of inner preferences is captured by the function of Absolute 
Risk Aversion
70 ARA of Friedman Savage (1949) and the function of Relative Risk Aversion 
RRA
71 of Arrows and Pratt (1964). In both cases, these functions are expressions of the 
first  and  second  derivatives  of  the  utility,  which  in  essence  capture  the  geometric 
characteristics of the utility.  
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As discussed above, the modeling of relative risk behavior uses to be done on household’s 
wealth.  The  function  of  RRA  says  that  actors  averse  to  risk  avoid  choices  that  could 
produce losses on assets. But wealth seems inappropriate for modeling an economic unit 
with insignificant assets. The idea of the function of RRA is that individuals are unwilling to 
expose their material wealth to losses, but the preference for liquid assets poses doubts 
on the capacity of wealth for tiding up the main concerns of peasants. Liquid are preferred 
to capital assets because they can be transformed almost directly in consumption
72. While 
an individual can survive with exiguous levels of welfare as the peasants actually do, no 
one can even be an economic actor without a minimal level of consumption. While the 
provision of consumption is a daily obligation, the acquisition of assets is only possible 
after some capacity for accumulation has been attained. It seems natural to acquiesce 
that  a  survivor  actor  regards  differently  one  risk  associated  to  wealth  than  a  risk 
associated to his consumption. 
 
It should not surprise that the RRA function cannot grasp the span of behavioral responses 
to risk of rural households. The evidence shows that peasants behave differently to risk, 
depending on the security of their horizon of consumption: even though peasants are 
averse  to  uncertainty,  they  behave  as  risk  neutral
73  or  risk  lovers
7475.  While  wealthier 
households are willing to take higher risks
76, less wealthy peasants which –tight but safe– 
expect to cover their consumption needs are willing to avoid risks
77; and peasants facing 
an  insecure  horizon  of  satisfactory  level  of  consumption  are  willing  to  accept  risky 
choices
78. The last two cases are consistent with ecological literature. Caraco et al. (1980) 
observed that birds avoid risk when they expect to receive enough food, and gamble 
when they have not sufficient food to maintain a level of “energy budget”
 79.  
 
With this background the modeling of the survivor actor is based upon two foundations: 
the acknowledged behavior of peasants that do not depend on inner attitudes exclusively, 
and the idea that peasants act optimally for smoothing their consumption. The modeling 
of survivor actors harmonizes with the traditional modeling summarized above. But in 
order to do that, it is necessary to differentiate risk from uncertainty, in order to explain 
coherently the discrepancies between attitudes toward risk revealed in experiments and 
the observed risk behavior. 
3.2  Aversion to Uncertainty 
A differentiation of uncertainty from risk is needed to account for inner attitudes toward 
risk  separately  from  other  factors  shaping  actual  risk  behavior.  Within  the  economic 
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literature it is common to find an undifferentiated use of uncertainty and risk as if they 
express the same thing. From the argumentation presented here, part of the failure on the 
treatment of risk behavior
80 rests on the lack of a clear distinction between uncertainty 
and  risk.  Historically,  this  distinction  has  been  tackled  under  two  perspectives.  Both 
approaches  give  important  but  incomplete  elements  for  the  analysis  of  peasants’  risk 
behavior. Yet, for building up a comprehensive approach of survivor actors, it is required a 
more  clear  distinction  between  risk  and  uncertainty  and  the  consideration  of  their 
economic motives. 
 
The first perspective of use in economics
81 due to Knight in 1921, points out that the 
difference between risk and uncertainty comes from the information available. For Knight, 
risk refers to the variability of random variables with known and uncertainty to variables 
with  unknown  distributions.  Risk  increases  with  variance.  Real  cases  are  intermediate 
situations between full information and full ignorance about the distribution of random 
variables. According to Knight, peasant’s behavior would be different if he holds a view of 
the variability of the process than if he doesn’t know anything about. Critics of Knight’s 
approach argue that the ignorance about a stochastic process is replaced by beliefs, and 
that at the end uncertainty and risk are the same
82. 
 
But Knight seems partially right. To account for real risk behavior one might for instance 
consider the differences between the adoption of a new technology totally new for the 
peasant and crop decision based on more familiar weather cycles. The distinction between 
Knight’s version and that arguing the existence of beliefs is not clear at two instances.  
 
On one side, a new technology appears in principle a problem of lemons in which the 
buyer is willing to risk below the market price because of lack of information. But one 
thing is to hold previous experiences with similar technologies, and another thing is to 
ignore  everything  about.  The  difference  between  these  two  situations  roots  in  the 
confidence on the beliefs the buyer may have about the product. There seems it exists a 
difference between knowledge and beliefs which gives support to Knight’s approach. 
 
On  the  other  side  and  more  crucial  for  survivor  actors,  the  differences  between  the 
acquisition  of  a  new  technology  and  risky  decisions  about  crops  may  hold  additional 
differences from the point of view of the potential impacts of a failure. There are different 
risks involved for the peasant if the technology in question doesn’t harm the survival of 
the actor as if it harms for instance the economic production or the consumption. For the 
last case, the survivor actor evidently will reject the technology. 
 
If the case is that the risk involved in the acquisition of a new technology encompasses the 
value of the investment but nothing else, and the player would remain the same as before 
despite the loss, i.e., the bet does not impact the status quo of the household, then the 
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regards on which the decision will be taken, will vary. It arises by the fact that what is 
harmed differs. If the hypothetical investment doesn’t harm anything else, it is a surplus in 
practice. Evidently, the hypothetical case of an investment loss does not apply to poor 
actors of course, since their situation is plenty of scarcity. Peasants do not have in money 
or in the outcome of their labor a surplus, but even peasants have surpluses that they are 
in position to bet. For instance, under pervasive unemployment leisure time becomes a 
surplus.  In  general,  an  asset  for  which  there  is  no  market  becomes  a  surplus.  Time 
becomes a surplus because its opportunity cost is zero.  
 
If the outcome of the random variable doesn’t impact the status quo of the household, i.e. 
via the production, one would expect for one game the peasant to rely on inner attitudes: 
He holds some surplus to bet and whether he gambles or not or how much he gambles, it 
depends on his attitudes. If this is the case, one might admit that there is no risk involved 
at all, because the gamble doesn’t harm anything more than the surplus betted. There is 
not risk since the opportunity cost of a surplus is zero. A peasant that bets his surplus time 
is not posing any risk to his status quo, i.e. his survival, because he is not loosing any 
opportunity. This could be the case of experimental games in which peasants are invited 
to bet their time. 
 
Whether the peasant is familiar with the stochastic process, whether he holds beliefs 
about this process or he doesn’t know anything about it, if the gamble doesn’t harm his 
survival and only a surplus is in play, there is no risk. If the game gambles a surplus, the 
observed behavior depends on inner attitudes. This attitude stands both for known and 
for  unknown process.  Consequently,  it  is  more  appropriate  to  call  it attitudes  toward 
uncertainty rather than attitudes toward risk. The bet of a surplus will reveal whether the 
player is averse, neutral or lover to uncertainty. 
3.3  Risk and Survival 
For the case of survivor actors like peasants, risk has to be considered under a different 
basis, closer to a second perspective about risk, usual in finance
83. Risk distinguishes from 
uncertainty, not from the degree of familiarity of the peasants with the random variable in 
question as Knight asserted. The adoption of an unknown technology brings about a risk 
only if it harms something different to a surplus. To become a risk, an uncertain event 
holds  a  potential  impact  with  a  consequent  cost.  Risk  is  the  exposure  to  an  impact 
inflicting a cost. For actors without major surpluses, actual risk behavior doesn’t follow 
from  attitudes  toward  uncertainty  but  from  risks  harming  real  matters.  As  risk  is  the 
exposure to an injury, it is weighed up in terms of something else. This gives sense to the 
expression  risk  of.  Yet,  for  analyzing  peasants’  decisions,  expressions  like  risk  of  crop 
failure or risk of low prices, do not provide accurate insights. Though these expressions 
refer direct or indirectly to impacts, they do not make specific allusion to what is harmed. 
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As  it  is  acknowledged,  peasants  pursue  for  a  smooth  pattern  of  consumption  and 
therefore, for survivor actors without major levels of wealth like peasants, the ultimate 
subject  against  which  all  risks  are  weighed  up  is  their  horizon  of  consumption.  The 
expectations  about  the  horizon  of  consumption  constitute  the  baseline  on  which  the 
survivor actor assesses risk and makes choices. Survivor actors compare the cost of a risk 
against the horizon of consumption, whose preservation constitutes their basic motive. 
 
For survivor actors like peasants, risk can be defined as a potential cost produced by the 
impact  of  a  random  outcome  that  harms  partial  or  totally  a  smooth  horizon  of  the 
household’s consumption, whether in form of eventual holes or as a level below a minimal 
acceptable consumption. Risk behavior would follow from inner attitudes, but additionally 
from the perception of the own ability to secure a smooth horizon of consumption. For a 
peasant,  if  the  bet  doesn’t  affect  the  smoothness  of  consumption  he  will  gamble 
depending on his attitudes toward uncertainty. If he realizes that the gamble harms the 
smoothness of his consumption, he will not gamble; and if he realizes that his economic 
activities do not provide a minimal acceptable smoothness on the consumption for the 
crop  cycle,  he  will  gamble.  For  a  comprehensive  approach  to  economic  behavior, the 
modeling of the economic actor should encompass both attitudes toward uncertainty and 
risk. 
3.4  The Function of Risk Behavior 
It is possible to capture in one simple function both the attitudes toward uncertainty and 
risk behavior motivated by survival concerns. The economic actor behaves consequently 
with risk, and not only from his inner attitudes toward risk. Let consider a function for the 
utility with 0 > ′ U , whose attitudes toward uncertainty and willingness to take risk are 
shaped by an exponent F ˆ γ : 
) ; ( ˆ F t t C U U γ =                                                              (1) 
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where  γ0  captures  the  attitudes  toward  uncertainty,  C0  is  the  minimal  consumption 
aspired to be daily secured, T is the horizon of time to be planned –the crop cycle–
84, and 
F ˆ   is  the  expected  outcome  of  economic  activities  providing  a  permanent  Flow  to 
consumption. The variable  F ˆ  represents a permanent income for economies with perfect 
markets, and market and non market activities supplying consumption to the household 
for economies with imperfect markets and for households with market holes. For this 
case, market activities may include revenues from crop farming, off farm labor (covariant 
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with  agriculture)  and  non  farm  labor  (not  covariant  with  agriculture).  Non  market 
activities include food crops and goods produced by the household for making up a living, 
ties  and  institutional  networks.  All  these  activities  have different  levels  of uncertainty 
though in general, more profitable activities are more risky also. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The function of risk behavior 
From (2) it can be seen that, if the actor expects to cover tight but safe its horizon of 
consumption  ( F T C ˆ
0 = ),  his  behavior  toward  risk  will  rely  on  inner  attitudes  toward 
uncertainty as it holds in the original model of Arrows-Pratt ( RRA RRB = − = 0 1 γ ). If the 
actor expects his activities will not provide a sufficient flow of consumption ( T C F 0 ˆ < ) he 
will gamble to survive; and finally, if the Flows providers of consumption produce more 
than sufficient ( T C F 0 ˆ > ), he will be willing to gamble, according to his inner attitudes 
toward uncertainty and proportionally to the surplus T C F 0 ˆ − . 
 
How the preferences and the expectations  F ˆ  are related? One possibility is to consider 
that  preferences  depend  on  expectations  and  therefore  the  curvature  of  the  utility 
function depends on the expectations, for example in a function 
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For this function the curvature of the utility will be the most concave if the expected Flows 
F ˆ equal the minimal acceptable consumption. If F T C ˆ

















0  becomes 
one, and the utility takes the form: 
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In this case risk behavior will be dictated by inner preferences and the utility function 
(which  measures  the  valuation  of  the  consumption)  will  determine  the  actual  risk 
behavior. For the remaining cases, in which the Flows are above or below the minimal 

















0 will be higher than one. The utility will tend 
to be linear or even convex, with more willingness to take risk if the Flows are below the 
minimal acceptable consumption T C0 , as the upper graph of figure 2 shows. 
 
This  option  for  modeling  actual  risk  behavior  and  utility  can  be  justified  with  several 
arguments. Fixed preferences are demanded for comparative static analysis but there are 
no reasons to assume they have to stand fixed inter-temporally. It is not suggested that 
expectations change during the crop cycle. If this were the case, a model has probably no 
solution. It is sensible to assume that preferences change during the lifetime of the actor, 
and that these preferences may change depending on expectations. In fact, it has been 
reported the attitudes toward risk change
85.  
 
Yet, this alternative leads to confusions, because those actors whose expectations are 
below the minimal acceptable consumption have to gamble in risky options even though 
they  could  reveal  aversion  to  uncertainty.  The  homologation  between  income  and 
consumption  in  the  utility  function  makes  them  to  appear  as  if  they  aspire  to 
consumptions  beyond  the  minimal T C0 ,  and  in  fact  they  would  be  fulfilled  if  they 
accomplish the minimal consumption T C0 . This is the risk puzzle reported elsewhere, in 
which risk–averse peasants are willing to gamble in risky options. But in fact, they gamble 
in risky options just because with non-risky options they would be starved.   
 
The utility values the consumption in terms of a satisfaction: for a given consumption C, 
there is a satisfaction U(C). But, as mentioned, risk behavior depends on the expectations 
of the household about its ability to accomplish its target: there is no option to avoid this 
mandate. Therefore, the function that describes the satisfaction from the consumption 
cannot describe the mandates of risk. If the modeling aims to describe actual economic 
behavior, it has to account for the cases in which the actor is forced to gamble regarding 
the risks he faces, no matter his inner attitudes. For a coherent analysis that preserves the 
concept of utility as satisfaction and additionally accounts for actual risk behavior, it is 
necessary to decouple a function of utility related to consumption from a function that 
describes risk behavior in terms of expectations and risk. 
3.5  The Model: Decoupling Behavior from Satisfaction 
A second possibility is to decouple the valuation of the consumption expressed in one 
function of satisfaction U  (equation 3a), from another function that shows the survivor 
behavior of the actor from his expectations. Consider the situation of a peasant forced to 
gamble in risky games because even though he is averse to uncertainty, if he rests on his 
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current  savings  0 S   and  on  a  food  crop
c Q ,  he  will  be  unable  to  reach  the  minimal 
consumption 0 C for the total cycle, as the next figure shows. 
 
 
Figure 3. Risk-averse peasant forced to gamble 
In principle the food crop
c Q doesn’t need investments, then the production can be seen 
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c L Q Q =                                                                  (4). 
 
As he cannot secure his survival with non-risky choices, he decides to undertake a risky 
and  more profitable  crop
f Q   that  can be described  with  a  Cobb-Douglas  function  for 
production: 
α α − =
1
1 I L Q f
f                                                                (5). 
 
The variability of
f Q can be considered proportional to the final output:  ( )
f f Q Q Var σ = , 
with  1 0 ≤ ≤σ .  Bad  weather  makes σ   close  to  1,  and  vice  versa.  The  labor  time  is 
distributed between the two crops f c L L L + = . The peasant decreases the labor for the 
food crop from Lto c L , and also is forced to invest an amount 1 I  in this crop. Hence, he 
reduces his secure though insufficient consumption from 0 S L Q
c
l +  to 1 0 I S L Q c
c
l − + . He has 
not only to achieve a minimal consumption 0 C , but to obtain additional savings 2 I  for the 
next cycle. We consider for this model that the investment ( ) r I I + = 1 1 2 . This condition 
secures the inter-temporal survival under expected variability. Moreover, the final Flows 
have to be free of risk, i.e. they have to be planned in excess for guarantying the final 
output will be at least 0 C  in the worst foreseeable case (i.e. with the expected variability).   30 
 
 
Figure 4. Risk behavior of a risk-averse actor under siege. 
















  shaped  by  the  expectations  on  the  flows  to 
consumption F ˆ . Since for this model all the flows map directly to consumption ( C F → ), 
we  preserve C as  variable,  yet  as  target.  Moreover,  for  the  sake  of  easiness  in  the 
notation,  we  consider  the  total  consumption 0 C   instead  of T C0 .  For  convergence  it  is 
assumed the exponent 1 ˆ > F γ . Finally, it is also assumed that if after allocating labor and 
saving in the best way for bridging the gap, the final attainable consumption is below 0 C , 
then the peasant makes use of ties for closing the gap. Yet, our interest is not to explore 
the singularities of the problem, but to model actual risk behavior of peasants that have to 
take risks even though they are risk averse, as it happens in real life where a solution 
exists. These elements define the optimization problem the peasant has to solve. Formally 
the problem is: 
( ) F C C V
ˆ
0 max




2 0 I C S L Q
c
l + < +         (Initial situation –Figure 4–) 




l + + = − + − + 1 , 1 1 1 1 0 σ   (Condition for inter-temporal survival) 
0 C C ≥            (Condition for survival in the cycle) 
0 1 S I ≤            (Absence of markets for credit) 
f c L L L + =           (Time scarcity) 
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Combining (8.12) and (8.13) we obtain
86: 
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For the existence of the optimal values ( )
*
1
* ,I Lf , it is required that (8.14) and (8.15) be 
positive, i.e. that the denominators be positive. These conditions lead to:  
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l                                  (8.16) 
 
Equation 8.16 says that for a survivor actor, a risky option like
f Q is required only if the 
productivity of labor of the food crop is below certain threshold. The important aspect to 
remark for policies is that the survivor households can be enhanced by strengthening the 
productivity of food crops. 
4  A Normative for Survivor Actors 
The assertion that peasants are survivor actors is not normative. It is not for defending a 
way of living as other approaches it suggests. Instead, it is to point up the actual ends of 
actors that do not have other chances beyond surviving. They abide as survivor actors not 
because they want, but just because they cannot get away. Further desirable goals like 
development have no sense for economic agents under risk of starvation. If survival were 
no longer the challenge that rural household must face, development would become a 
feasible goal. Peasants would embrace further goals as far as the risk of holes in their 
consumption vanishes. As these actors move away from the risk of starvation (as they 
foresee a clarified horizon in consumption), their interests would become similar with 
other actors: they would care about wealth; they would hold decreasing absolute risk 
aversion and increasing relative risk aversion. 
 
The call for a normative for survivor actors is not against development. Instead, it is a call 
for a detailed consideration of the actual concerns of peasant households. The insistence 
on the survivor nature of peasants claims for a deserved awareness of one stage that 
policy makers should first attend in order to achieve reliable pathways for overcoming 
poverty. Before development, a rural household should be enhanced with reliable means 
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and resources for surviving in the best way, according to the strategies they use to smooth 
consumption.  
4.1  What Could Be 
Whether other desirable goals beyond a reliable survival are attainable, it depends on the 
feasibility to overcome the pervasive imperfection of markets. The perfection of markets 
is desirable and should be the solution, but its recurrent failure in rural areas proves it 
doesn’t work as a rule. Somewhere and under specific conditions, the normative of the 
perfection of markets would help the rural households to stop being survivor actors. Yet, 
their isolation, lack of land, low demographic density, transaction costs, insecure rights on 
property and fragile infrastructure that characterize rural settings everywhere, make that 
policies aimed to improve markets do not reach the majority of rural households. 
 
The enhancement of the ability of rural households to survive doesn’t hold as condition 
the reinforcement of markets. The strengthening of the rural households does not have 
necessarily  to  do  with  the  access  to  or  the  improvement  of  markets.  Policies  for  the 
reinforcement of markets do not focus on the enhancement of the ability to survive. 
These abilities can be enhanced in different ways. One option is for example to diversify 
and raise the productivity of food crops, as the model above it suggests. Rural households 
would  be  helped  if  they  were  provided  with  reliable  facilities  for  extending  as  far  as 
possible the durability and the quality of stored food. Peasants would be better off if they 
were endowed with sufficient area plots for securing their self consumption, or with the 
provision of technologies like pumps for make safe water supply.  
 
The  canon  of  the  perfection of  markets impedes  to  visualize  what  is appropriate  and 
attainable in rural settings. A normative for the survivor actor has to consider what is 
feasible beyond what is desirable. Such normative has to reformulate the guidelines of 
programs for rural development, from the traditional what should be, to a new what could 
be. A normative of what could be focuses on the provision and strengthening of means, 
resources and local institutions for securing the horizon of consumption. It appeals to 
market  and  non-market  mechanisms  for  enhancing  rural  communities  to  become 
autonomous in the provision of food and other livelihoods for making up a decent life. 
4.2  Between Livelihoods and the Achilles’ heel of Development Economics 
Current normative approaches like food security and rural livelihoods, call for attending 
rural  people’s  real  concerns  and  for  a  better  understanding  of  their  strategies.  The 
movement of food security claims for policies to support actual concerns about food. 
Other programs focus on subsidies for consumption. The livelihood approach calls for a 
better appraisals of rural livelihoods. It is also evident the lack theoretical approaches for 
describing the situation of risk averse actors forced to gamble in risky choices for securing 
a living, in spite of the growing implementation of policies subsidizing consumption: there 
is  a  gap  between  microeconomic  descriptions  tiding  up  rural  concerns  and  normative 
approaches of food security, rural livelihoods and policies subsidizing consumption. These   33 
normative approaches would gain more influence in policy trends if they were supported 
by descriptive models. It is also demanded a framework that accounts for peasants as 




It  is  possible  to  bring  into  concurrent  lines  formal  descriptions,  actual  features  and 
sensible claims about food security and rural livelihoods. A superior approach has to get 
rid of several assumptions at each side. For the movement of rural livelihoods, assets are 
not productive inputs only but outputs themselves. Assets make up a way of living. For 
them, policies should weigh rural motives and values. Yet, it is not clear to what extent 
those  assets  and  livelihood  strategies  are  goals  themselves.  From  an  economic 
perspective, the idea that assets hold values that prevail over the worth of their function is 
indefensible.  The  earliest  notion  of  non  rational  peasants  and  later  subsistence 
approaches, both share as fetter a belief about substantial differences between peasants 
and other economic actors, which the livelihood approach would seem to replicate. It is 
essential to ask if the perception of rural livelihoods as goals and values comes from real 
motives or from the appearance given by a steady state without chances to develop. 
 
On the other side, it should be admitted that the model of utility based on preferences 
does not model actual risk behavior. If the theory were perfect, its immovability would be 
valid as precondition. But it isn’t. The usual model doesn’t grasp the behavioral outcomes 
ruled by the expectations of the household. It should not be forgotten that economics is 
for describing human behavior, and not for human beings to behave according to the 
theory. If the prevailing vision in which actual behavior should emerge from preferences 
must be taken as granted, the convergence of approaches is unlikely, since the connection 
between motives and behavior is only apparent. 
 
Yet, the search for new descriptions is not for supporting a normative. It is just motivated 
by the inability of the prevailing model to identify peasants’ goals and drivers, and for 
describing their actions with precision. 
4.3  The Variables of Policies for Enhancing Survivor Actors 
The  economy  of  survivor  actors  rely  on  market  and  non  market  activities
88.  The 
improvement of the ability of peasants for surviving in the best possible way can be made 
by  reinforcing  options  based  on  markets.  However,  this  ability  can  be  reinforced  by 
improving  the  capacity  for  allocating  temporal  and  spatially  their  consumption.  The 
research of the nineties and of this century on risk sharing shows that, more than an 
allocation  of  internal  resources,  peasants  deploy  temporal  and  spatial  strategies  for 
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securing a smooth consumption
8990. Peasants deploy consumption smoothing strategies 
according to their positions. The position of each household refers to the effective access 
of the household to the economic offer of the context. This position is defined by the 
endowments and skills.  
 
The strategies for smoothing consumption are dependant variables of the context and the 
position (the independent variables), and are endogenous to the household. More than 
reallocating  their  internal  resources  in  response  to  external  changes,  rural  families 
reconfigure their share of strategies. This is what scholars study in the economics of risk 
sharing.  Indeed  all  the  normative  literature  related  with  risk-sharing  belongs  to  a 
normative for the survivor peasant. Policies may force peasants to rely on riskier, more 
costly and non-reliable strategies, or they can induce less demanding plans. Policies should 
provoke the adoption of reliable strategies with lower labor costs. 
 
Strategies  are  not  just  decisions,  but  complete  plans  of  actions  that  account  for  all 
possible contingencies. The rural world is full of contingencies and the strategies evolved 
by  peasantry  are  refined  schemes  aimed  to  reduce  the  impact  of  uncertainty  and  to 
control the expected outputs. The strategies are: smoothing, diversifying, accumulating 
and risk-sharing. Smoothing strategies work on income and crop outputs and map into 
consumption  smoothing  directly.  Remittances  and  non-farm  work  are  best  smoothing 
options  because  do  not  depend  on  weather.  Since  the  demand  for  off-farm  work 
correlates with weather, its contribution to smoothing is relative. Peasants smooth crop 
outputs with resistant varieties and increased labor. Diversifying strategies fill the holes 
uncovered by smoothing strategies, whether with risky and food crops, or with off-farm 
and  non-farm  work.  It  requires  specialization  in  crops  and  a  good  position  to  access 
several  job  markets.  Diversifying  demands  more  labor  and  planning,  and  therefore 
becomes a more costly strategy. Accumulating is the preferred strategy for pastoralist 
peasants. In African savannas, wealthiest peasants rely on cattle while the poorest do on 
off-farm, non-farm work, and food crops. Accumulation is carried out on assets, livestock, 
money or food. Rural Andean homes are built with minimal ventilation, because peasants 
store food inside. Risk-sharing is given by social integration through family ties, affiliations 
to informal networks, etc. Networking is useful for unexpected shocks that cannot be 
absorbed by income and assets stocks. It is the less efficient strategy: peasants cannot 
survive  relying  on  networks  since  the  level  of  support  is  limited.  Smoothing  and 
diversifying strategies produce income, and food storing, savings or accumulating assets 
demand  facilities,  i.e.  accumulating  and  networking  are  complementary  to  strategies 
producing income. 
4.4  How Policies Optimize Survivor Behavior 
Really enhancing policies have to care for all economic, physical and temporal aspects of 
surviving.  Policies  for  agriculture  help  to  solve  income  problems,  but  ignore  temporal 
                                                      
89 Alderman and Paxon (1992) 
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issues:  storing  facilities  and  markets  for  accumulation.  Peasants  demand  policies, 
conceived  as  sets  of  measures,  responsible  for  income  (no  matter  the  source)  and 
accumulation, and for assimilating shocks. There are no recipes for enhancing the ability 
of rural families to survive; more functional is to identify the set of independent and 
dependent variables for policies, as well as its expected outcomes. 
 
With dissimilar impacts on the distribution of benefits, policies perform on the sets of 
independent  variables:  the  external  context  and  the  households’  position.  Policies  for 
widening or reinforcing the context aim to benefit the whole community, but the share of 
gains  cannot  be  controlled  and  best  positioned  families  benefit  more.  Policies  for 
improving households’ positions control the share. For distributed impacts, policies might 
start with (less expensive) programs for improving households’ positions, and follow with 
(more complex) measures for widening or reinforcing the context. If the context grows 
and households are able to perform fully on it, peasants would increase their chances to 
smooth  consumption.  Yet,  growing  the  context  in  all  directions  or  positioning  all 
households for using the whole context is not feasible. It might be considered to create 
markets, though reinforcing those already existing is easier. In addition, not all measures 
induce the desired outputs. Existing livelihoods and funds for policies are scarce. Hence, 
policy  makers  need  to  understand  how  changes  on  independent  variables  affect  the 
dependent ones, in order to know which measures yield more. 
 
An optimal share of strategies accounts not only for options producing income, but for 
strengthening the capacity for storing and saving, whether saving money or in from of 
liquid assets. Peasants accumulate more if they have better facilities for storing or access 
to markets for assets. Markets for credit usually fail in rural areas due to transaction costs, 
but  i.e.  markets  for  livestock  are  more  resilient.  Creating  markets  for  assets  demand 
reliable access to some resources, i.e. land, feed or markets for complementary goods. 
Markets can be reinforced in many ways: with infrastructure for transportation, market 
places, stores, specialization of households for improving labor supply, etc. Villages relying 
on diversifying strategies or lacking markets for groceries should be complemented with 
accumulating  facilities.  Relatively  isolated  households  can  be  enhanced  with  low  and 
stable prices for livestock inputs, new food crops, programs for vegetable gardens, silos, 
etc. Impacts of resource scarcity can be lessened with technology, i.e. efficient cook stoves 
for areas bearing biomass shortage, water pumps, etc. 
 
Appendix: The Model. 
 
The Lagrangian can be written as: 
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Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ; ; 0
1
0 ˆ 0 0
1
0 ˆ
ˆ ˆ = + + − − ≥ ≤ + + − =
∂
∂ − − β λ γ β λ γ
γ γ F F C C C C C C C C
C
Z
F F             (8.1) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 2 2






= − − + + + −









L I Q r r I S
I S L I Q r r
I
Z
σ β β λ
σ β β λ
                                         (8.2) 
 
0 ; ; 0 = − − − > ≤ − − − =
∂
∂










Q Q L L Q Q
L
Z                                               (8.3) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1
; ; 0 1
= − − − − −
≥ ≤= − − − − =
∂
∂
θ σ β λ











Q Q L L
L L Q Q
L
Z
                                                           (8.4) 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 2
; 0 ; 0 2
0 1
0 1
= − + − + +
≥ > − + − + + =
∂
∂
S L L Q r I C










λ                                                            (8.5) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 2
; 0 ; 0 , 1 2
1 0 1
1 0 1
= − − − − + +













L I Q S L Q r I C




β                                        (8.6) 
 
( ) 0 ; 0 ; 0 = − − ≥ = − − =
∂
∂




                                                   (8.7) 
 




ˆ − − − = F C C F
γ γ β . Additionally, given that  c L L >  the equation (8.3) becomes
c
l Q β θ − = . 
 
The set of equations transform into: 
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f c L L L + =                                                                                                                   (8.7) 
 
Additionally, from equation (5) it is known that: 
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Let assume that an interior solution exists, i.e.  0 C C > ,  1 0 I S >  and  f L L > . From (8.1):  0 ≠ β . 
From (8.2) and combining with (8.8):  
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Combining (8.10) and (8.11 the relationship between 
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If we rest (8.6) from (8.5), taking into account (8.7), we obtain the expression: 
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